UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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NEFISSA KRAIEM, : Case No.: 19-cv-5160

Plaintiff, :

V .

JONESTRADING INSTITUTIONAL : New York, New York

SERVICES, et al., : October 27, 2023

Defendants. :

----:

TRANSCRIPT AND STATUS CONFERENCE HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

## APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff: STULBERG & WALSH LLP

BY: James L. deBoer, Esq.
Robert B. Stulberg, Esq.

14 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

For Defendants: KAUFMAN BORGEEST & RYAN, LLP

BY: Daniel H. Lewkowicz, Esq.

875 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; Transcript produced by transcription service

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              THE COURT: Good morning. This is
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     Magistrate Judge Aaron. This is the matter of
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     Kraiem Against Jones Trading Institutional Services,
     LLC; 19cv5160. This line is being recorded.
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5
              I'd like to have the parties identify
6
     themselves please for the record, starting with
7
     counsel for the plaintiff.
8
              MR. STULBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
 9
     morning. Robert B. Stulberg of the firm Stulberg &
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     Walsh, counsel of record, and my associate, James
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     deBoer, who will be arguing the letter motion.
12
              MR. LEWKOWICZ: Thank you. My name is
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     Daniel Lewkowicz, and I'm counsel at Kaufman,
14
     Borgeest & Ryan, and we are representing the
     defendants in this matter.
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16
              THE COURT: All right. And did you
17
     indicate you had somebody else on the line with you,
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     or am I mistaken?
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              MR. LEWKOWICZ: No, no, just -- just I will
20
     be appearing.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So I had a few questions
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     before I turn the floor over to the parties to make
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     whatever additional points they wish to make that
24
     are independent of the letter submissions that were
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            So this question is for the defense side.
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In the letter response that was filed on
October 25th, at ECF 173, in footnote 2, I'm reading
what it states: "Defendants have communicated to
plaintiff that they are amenable to expanding the
period for discoverable documents through
plaintiff's end of employment (through January 15,
2018)."
         Have you done that, or that's just
something that you offered?
        MR. LEWKOWICZ: So we've had numerous
discussions about the potential scope. Originally I
articulated our position that we believe this really
should be narrowed to when the plaintiff actually
left the United States and after the events
occurred. And so I've communicated that we'd be
willing to produce documents through January 15,
2018. And, in fact, unilaterally, we did produce
documents through January 15, 2018, which was when
her termination ended with JTIL in the United
Kingdom.
         THE COURT: So the short answer to my
question is that you've already produced those
documents?
         MR. LEWKOWICZ: Yes.
         THE COURT: Okay. Give me a second.
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1
              My next question relates to -- let's see.
2
     So in plaintiff's reply that was filed -- please let
 3
     me find it here -- at ECF 176 early this morning, it
     states at page three, and I'm quoting, "Defendants
 4
5
     represent that they have separately already produced
     all documents containing plaintiff's name."
 6
 7
              And my question for the defendants, is that
8
     true?
9
              MR. LEWKOWICZ: So not outside the time
10
     frame that we believe should be -- that the -- that
11
     the discovery should be limited to.
12
              THE COURT: But --
13
              MR. LEWKOWICZ: Included in our --
14
              THE COURT: Go ahead.
              MR. LEWKOWICZ: Included in our previous
15
16
     productions were documents that would have
17
     referenced any version of the names that were
18
     provided by plaintiffs. So "Nef," "Nefissa,"
19
     "Nefissa SK," "Nefissa SK" with an extension.
20
     "Nefissa Soraya Kraiem," "NK". So any of those we
21
     produced.
22
              THE COURT: All right. So in plaintiff's
23
     reply that is filed at ECF 176, on pages two and
24
     three, appear hit counts for certain terms.
25
     for example, the term "ass," A-S-S, it says 67. And
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that number appears to the Court to come from Exhibit B to defendant's September 13, 2023 letter that was filed at ECF 171-10 on page eight. Those numbers match up.

Now, when I look at that exhibit, there's a footnote 13 on PDF page eight, which appears -- at the top it says -- of Exhibit B, 171-10 PDF page eight it says, "keyword". There's footnote 13. At the bottom it says, (narrowed by) "AND," and then the various permutations you just mentioned, "Kraiem" or "Nef" or "Nefissa," et cetera.

If you've already produced documents containing her name, then everything you have listed here already would have been produced. Or am I missing something?

MR. LEWKOWICZ: So this proposal was for -these were the hit counts for documents that dated
all the way to, I believe, January 2017, right. So
these are more documents than we were necessarily
agreeing to, because in our objections we said we
believe the time period should be limited. But
based on a broader time frame, these are the number
of document hit counts we're receiving. So I don't
believe --

THE COURT: All right. So you have to tell

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1
     me what time period these keywords related to.
2
              MR. LEWKOWICZ: Right. These exhibits, I
 3
     believe, would have been all hit counts for January
 4
     2017 through January -- through actually March 2018.
5
     So slightly larger. But these were the hit counts
 6
     we had when we asked our vendor to tell us how many
     times the word "ass" would appear in connection with
7
8
     these particular names or perceived names for
 9
     plaintiff.
10
              THE COURT: All right. And have you -- so
11
     there's overlap then, right?
12
              MR. LEWKOWICZ: Yes.
13
              THE COURT: So some of these documents
14
     already would have been produced?
15
              MR. LEWKOWICZ:
                              Yes.
              THE COURT: All right. And in terms of
16
17
     what you have uploaded already with your vendor to
18
     the document review platform, do you have documents
19
     dating back -- ESI dating back to May 25, 2016,
20
     which is the date that this plaintiff started
21
     working in the UK?
22
              MR. LEWKOWICZ: Yes.
23
              THE COURT: And do you already have
24
     uploaded to the ECF -- excuse me, the ESI review
25
     platform just documents going through January 15 of
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1
     2018, which is the date that her employment ended?
 2
              MR. LEWKOWICZ: Yes.
              THE COURT: Okay. All right. Just give me
 3
     a second. Just writing some notes.
 4
 5
              And one point of clarification in footnote
 6
     13 in ECF 171-10. That's the letter that I
 7
     mentioned back from September. There's a hyphen
8
     between the search term "Nefissa-SK". There's a
     hyphen between "Nefissa" and "SK". But in the
 9
10
     letter that you filed at ECF 173, your response
     letter page three, there is no hyphen. It would
11
12
     make sense to me that there shouldn't be a hyphen,
13
     because that wouldn't -- but I just wanted to make
14
     sure.
              MR. LEWKOWICZ:
                              Sure. I can double check
15
16
     what the actual -- I may not have that exact thing
17
     in front of me, whether -- I don't believe there was
18
     a hyphen in what was actually applied by the vendor,
19
     but I can always double check and let the Court
20
     know.
21
              THE COURT: All right. Just give me a sec.
22
              So a question for plaintiff's counsel.
23
     Have any depositions been taken in this case?
24
              MR. deBOER: Not yet, Your Honor. We have
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scheduled depositions with defendants.

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              THE COURT: Those are the ones that are set
 2
     forth in the letter filed yesterday evening?
 3
              MR. deBOER: Yes, that's correct, Your
 4
     Honor.
 5
              THE COURT: Okay. All right. Those were
 6
     all the questions that I had for now. I'm happy to
     hear. So keeping in mind that I've reviewed the
 7
8
     parties' submissions, I'm happy to hear whatever
 9
     else the parties wish to say about the pending
10
     letter of motion. So I'll start with plaintiff's
11
     counsel.
12
              MR. deBOER: Thank you very much, Your
13
     Honor.
14
               I wanted to highlight the ruling that Judge
     Carter made on January 24, 2022, in which he
15
16
     denied --
17
              THE COURT: Do you mean 2022 or -- just
     want to make sure I have the year right.
18
19
              MR. deBOER: Yes, that's correct.
                                                  And I
20
     can give you the docket number as well, Your Honor,
21
     for that. That is docket 145.
22
              THE COURT: Okay. So you're not referring
23
     to the first decision that he rendered, which was
24
     back in September of 2020. You're talking about his
25
     ruling from January of 2022, okay.
```

MR. deBOER: Yes, that's correct. I believe we might have referenced the earlier ruling at some juncture relating to the criteria for joint employer factors.

In the January of 2022 ruling, Judge Carter held that numerous paragraphs of plaintiff's complaint should not be struck because, I quote, "they offer relevant context of the actionable claims in this case."

So Judge Carter already held that paragraphs in the complaint describing activities of a harassing nature that plaintiff experienced prior to April 27, 2017, are relevant for understanding the allegations, the operative allegations in the complaint.

So our position is we do not see any reason for why defendants would limit the period of discovery to April 27th to January 15th of 2018. Because, as Judge Carter will -- incidents that happened before then, names that plaintiff was called that happened before then are relevant. And they're relevant whether people, Jones managers and supervisors called her those sexist terms to her face, or as the Second Circuit has held in *Torres v. Pisano* at 116 F.3rd 625 at 633.

The fact that statements might not have been made to her face but behind her back are also relevant for establishing discrimination claim. So the time frame should not be unduly narrowed, nor should the search terms be restricted to terms that already contain plaintiff's name. Because, as the defendants have explained, they have agreed to produce documents with plaintiff's name from the period. And I do apologize that might not have been the clearest that it could have been in our submission. But from April 27, 2017 through January 15, 2018, all documents containing plaintiff's name.

Well, there are a number of instances, and I'd have to go back and confirm if we have the correct numbers, but there's a number of instances in which plaintiff is referred to by a term, but her name does not appear in the document.

An example of that is included as Exhibit 12, where plaintiff's supervisor, Gary Cunningham, refers to the plaintiff as "Princess" and doesn't have any mention of her name. So this indicates that management is calling her names, derogatory, sexist names behind her back in documents that do not also contain her name.

So that restriction does not hold water

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     because, in fact, documents referring to plaintiff
 2
     by a derogatory term without her name might be very
 3
     probative of the mentality of plaintiff's managers
     and supervisors at Jones and the individual
 4
 5
     defendants.
 6
              THE COURT: A question for you. So I see
 7
     this document you're referring to is attached to
 8
     your reply. What search term, or how was this
 9
     document obtained? Why is it that this document was
     produced; do you know?
10
11
              MR. deBOER: Yes, Your Honor. Defendants
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     did agree to produce documents containing a small
13
     handful of terms that do not also contain
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     plaintiff's name, so I could tell you what those
                 "Princess" was one of them. I'm sorry.
15
     terms are.
16
               THE COURT: So they did agree to produce
     "Princess"?
17
18
              MR. deBOER: Yes, that's correct.
19
              THE COURT: So this example of what they
20
     were referring to your client as, they've already
21
     produced "Princess"?
22
              MR. deBOER: Yes, that's correct.
23
     they've produced "Princess". They haven't produced
24
     the word -- I'm going to spell it out just to avoid
25
     impropriety -- but B-I-T-C-H, which is a word that
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1 plaintiff has informed us she believes she was 2 called by management. But we don't have documents 3 in which that word appears, but not plaintiff's 4 name. 5 THE COURT: Well, if one is speaking in a 6 derogatory manner about someone, was there more than one woman who worked at this entity in the United 7 8 Kingdom or in the United States? 9 MR. deBOER: There are very few, Your 10 Plaintiff was the only female trader at the Honor. 11 London office. There were, I believe, three out of maybe 100 female traders in other locations at. 12 13 Jones. 14 THE COURT: Okay. But my point is, put aside traders, there'd be any number of people who 15 16 inappropriately used that phrase if these folks 17 threw that phrase around. That's my only point. 18 Whereas, someone who's a "Princess" presumably 19 refers to a single person. But maybe I'm wrong. 20 MR. deBOER: Well, Your Honor, our position 21 is we're entitled to documents in which defendants 22 are referring to plaintiff by derogatory terms, 23 whether or not her name is included. If there are 24 documents --

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THE COURT: I know, but the problem that

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     you have is, if you want them to search all their
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     e-mails for the word B-I-T-C-H, that doesn't seem to
 3
     me to be proportional to the needs of the case, but
     okay, I hear your point. I hear your argument.
 4
 5
     can continue.
 6
              MR. STULBERG: Your Honor, Robert Stulberg.
 7
     I just wanted to --
8
              THE COURT: Mr. Stulberg, obviously I'm
 9
     happy to hear from you, but -- go ahead, I didn't
10
     know it was going to be double-teamed. Go ahead.
11
              MR. STULBERG: I will not say anything if
12
     Your Honor prefers.
13
              THE COURT: No, go ahead. You want to make
14
     a point about the B-I-T-C-H word?
                                         Proceed.
15
              MR. STULBERG: Yes. The relevance of that
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     word and a number of others quite like it to this
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     case is, not only that they were used to refer to
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     our client, but that they were used in the
19
     workplace, characterized women in general.
20
              And our contention is that our client has
21
     been or was subjected to a hostile work environment.
22
     And the use of those types of terms in the middle of
23
     a workplace are obviously hostile to women.
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just wanted to mention that, lest these words be

viewed as relevant only with respect to Nefissa

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25

Kraiem.

THE COURT: No, but look, here's what the issue is. The issue is you're not representing women in a class action against the joint employers here, the alleged joint employers.

You have a client who claims that certain incidents occurred here in the United States that are actionable. In April in Texas, in May in Connecticut and in July, all of 2017 in New York City. And sexual harassment or a hostile work environment writ large of the entire organization, you conducting discovery class-wide, for lack of a better term, doesn't seem to me to be proportional to the needs of the case.

But look, I hear your argument, and I'm ready to hear what additional arguments you have.

MR. STULBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. I turn it back to Mr. deBoer.

MR. deBOER: Yes, thank you, Your Honor.

And I do see now, I'm referring to Exhibit 6, which is the July 20, 2023 letter from defendants. And this letter also contains tallies of search terms.

THE COURT: Could you give me an ECF number? Sorry, just while following along.

MR. deBOER: Yes, I beg your pardon, Your

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             So this is going to be document 171, and
 2
     then it's Exhibit 6 of that submission.
 3
              THE COURT: Okay. So hold on. I'm just
 4
     clicking it. So it's 171-6?
 5
              MR. deBOER: Yes, I believe so.
 6
              THE COURT:
                           Okay. And this is a July 20
 7
              That's what you're referring to?
     letter?
8
              MR. deBOER: Yes, Your Honor.
 9
              THE COURT: And what page? I'm sorry.
10
              MR. deBOER: And now I'm on page two of
11
     that letter.
              THE COURT: Okay. I'm there.
12
13
              MR. deBOER: And I'm looking at the second
14
     to last line where there's a tally for how many
     times the word that we're seeking occurs.
15
16
              THE COURT: Yeah, that's not this letter
17
     because this letter on page two is -- talks about
18
     interrogatories.
19
              What oftentimes happens is the numbers
20
     don't line up with the 171-6, you know what I mean?
21
     It doesn't line up with exhibit numbers. So let me
     go to the --
22
23
              MR. deBOER: Yeah, there were a couple of
24
     things on the same date.
25
              THE COURT: So are you at your computer to
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1
     tell me what -- oh, maybe it's seven. Seven says,
 2
     defendant's tally of search term results.
 3
              MR. deBOER: Yes, Your Honor. That's the
 4
     one.
 5
              THE COURT: Okay. All right. I've clicked
 6
     on that. Hold on.
 7
              Okay. So you're at the bottom of which
8
     page?
 9
              MR. deBOER: Page two.
10
              THE COURT: Okay. I'm there. I see a list
11
     of search term hits. Family action note.
12
              Okay. Which one are you calling to my
     attention?
13
14
              MR. deBOER: Still on the B-I-T-C-H, and
     there's 74 hits and 83 in the family.
15
16
              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
17
              MR. deBOER: And this section is reflecting
18
     the tally for the search results for one group of
19
     custodians. And then on page eight there's another
20
     tally reflecting the number of results for a
     different set of custodians. And on the other page
21
     that same word appears -- this is page eight --
22
23
     appears on about the 10th line, 12th line.
24
              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
25
              MR. deBOER: So the point I'm making here
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is that there are certain terms that we realize are going to be voluminous, but there are other terms that certainly are not going to be voluminous and would be very much proportional to the needs of the case, especially given plaintiff's understanding that she's been called these terms.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. deBOER: Thank you, Your Honor.

The other point that I'd like to make on this topic is certain requests that we've made for documents that defendants have denied altogether.

And these are requests 11 and 12, which seek documents relating to use and abuse of controlled substances at Jones. And then request 16 for all JonesTrading International Limited employment contracts, which would be relevant to demonstrating the joint employer factors, which includes centralized control of labor relations. And then documents 50 through 52, which pertain to —document request 50 to 52 pertain to Mary Moser, who was — I'm not quite sure her title, but she was acting as human resources director for both JTIS and JTIL during all relevant times.

And our last point that we do discuss in the response is that other complaints of harassment

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     are highly relevant, as many Courts have found, to
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     establishing the likelihood of plaintiff's
     allegations. And courts routinely extend the period
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     for which those complaints are discoverable beyond
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     the time of the plaintiff's employment.
              So for that reason, defendant's limitation
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7
     from April 27 through January 15 -- April 27, 2017,
8
     through January 25, 2018, is unwarranted.
 9
              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. deBOER: If Your Honor has any further
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     questions, I'd be happy to assist as I'm able.
              THE COURT: Yeah, I don't at the moment.
12
              Let me hear from defense counsel
13
14
     recognizing that I've read all the submissions, but
15
     go ahead.
16
              MR. LEWKOWICZ:
                               Thank you, Your Honor.
     don't want to belabor the point. And especially
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     since you've read all the submissions.
18
19
               I feel there's an element of nitpicking
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     that's taking place here as to particular words that
21
     the party believes are only coming up in narrow
     hits, but still may not be relevant because a
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     person, for example, may say "that person is
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     bitching about this," as opposed to referring to the
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plaintiff in any way as "a bitch". And so narrowing

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it by search parameters, we believe, is a very valuable way to get to only relevant documents as opposed to any document that may exist across 25 custodians, across 23 offices, across the whole institution.

These documents are not just emails, but also Bloomberg instant chats, where people are engaging in very long conversations that may periodically be talking about family relations, conversations they had with clients, things wholly unrelated to this case, to the plaintiff or to just anything that occurred here. Some of these are even just news articles that come up. And these words appearing, for example, even though we provided the word -- documents with the word "Princess" in it because it was a very specific reference that plaintiff's counsel identified for us. You know, the word "Princess" appears in conversations when people are talking about bringing their children to Disneyland. Lion King in referring to actually going to the play, Lion King.

So that's why these documents, without any search parameters become extremely voluminous in nature. And our proposal was really referencing the narrowing of search terms by search parameters to

get even this voluminous number of documents. But if you look at the word "entertainment," for example, in Exhibit B to our proposal to plaintiff on September 13, that still produces 960 documents. If we actually look at what that word would produce without any narrowing, we're getting over 6,500 hits. And we find that for many of the very broad words that are referred to.

That is also one of the problems with, aside from our objection as to just broadly searching for any reference to anything that might have to do with any potential drug, alcohol or kind of these bizarre allegations about sex workers, they include the word "green" in their keywords. I presume "green" is a reference to marijuana, but the word "green" has a hit count, just a hit count of over 16,600 documents.

And then with "family," which we're required to -- we would be required to review, elevates almost to 36,000 hits. I mean this is -- given especially what we've produced to date, this is just in no way proportionate to the needs of this case, especially in light of the fact that we're really talking about, at best, eight days that the plaintiff spent for the entire year of her

employment with JTIL in the United States whatsoever. To broaden the period beyond not only these eight days, but beyond her period of employment, it just -- it seems like it's a fishing expedition. And as we stated in our submission, it seems almost harassing. It would cost us an exorbitant amount of money to review these documents for privilege, for relevancy.

And then presumably, even if we were to provide these documents, we would receive more requests from plaintiff's counsel. To date, we have not had really a response to our proposal from plaintiff that in any way seems to be working collaboratively with us to find a way to narrow the number of documents that they're seeking. It really seems like they're looking broadly for just about anything that might have occurred at any one of our offices, even ones that plaintiff had never worked across, been in, you know, whatsoever.

That being said, we've communicated to plaintiff's counsel that we had HR specifically look for documents related to the joint employer allegations, and that we collected and produced and provided debate numbers for organizational charts for JTIL and JTIS, documents related to labor

relations, management and ownership data. And that was all produced. And we told them that we don't have more relevant documents in that regard. They also have all the communications that may have occurred between Mary Moser, who was a consultant, not an employee at the time, and thus doesn't have a personnel file, and those communications and interactions have already been provided.

Further, we've also communicated that HR confirmed to us that there are no complaints that we have about harassing, abusive, discriminatory conduct that occurred at -- or otherwise at JTIS, or relate to any of the individual defendants in the case. And that was communicated.

So, you know, these ESI terms are really just meant to be a backup to our obligation to find relevant documents. And they really need to be tailored in a way that ensure that only relevant documents are identified, especially given the fact that this case is far narrower than maybe other employment-related disputes that are being referred to in cases cited by opposing counsel.

So unless you have any questions for me, that's pretty much our position on this.

THE COURT: All right. I don't.

Any final comment by plaintiff's counsel?

MR. deBOER: Yes, Your Honor.

Defendant's counsel just stated that they've given us, produced to us a number of joint employer-related documents and other complaints about -- that other people have lodged with Jones of abusive or harassing nature.

THE COURT: Well, to be clear, what I heard him say is that there weren't complaints about the latter and that he had produced the former.

MR. deBOER: Yes, Your Honor. The one complaint was plaintiff's own complaint that we've received. That, I believe -- although I'd be happy to be mistaken, but I believe that that is still narrowed to the period for all of the above, April 27, 2017 through January 15, 2018, which for the reasons that I mentioned earlier, is an inappropriate limitation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. deBOER: And just to reiterate, the defendant's contention that the facts of the operative allegations of this case being limited to eight days, again, ignores the earlier ruling by Judge Carter that the context is relevant, and therefore, provides important background information

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to understand what exactly happened in those eight days, and why a reasonable woman would have experienced the harassment, the sexual bullying in the way that plaintiff did as harassing events. THE COURT: All right. MR. LEWKOWICZ: Your Honor, if I may, on just one small point as far as providing context. THE COURT: Very briefly. MR. LEWKOWICZ: Very briefly. On August 4, we provided back to plaintiff, all of the documents we have in our possession that relate to any of the claims, assertions or 13 proceedings that occurred in the United Kingdom, 14 which may also include some of these context-based documents that they say they need now. But many of these documents have already been exchanged by the parties during a very long protracted dispute that has already been dropped with prejudice in the United Kingdom. THE COURT: All right. Here's my ruling: The Court has great familiarity with this case, which was filed over four years ago in May

The central allegations made by plaintiff in this case are that she suffered harassment and retaliation as a result of the incidents that

occurred in Dallas, Texas in April 2017; Greenwich, Connecticut in May 2017; and in New York City from July 10 to July 16, 2017.

Following the filing of an amended pleading by plaintiff in December of 2019, District Judge Carter in September 2020 granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss that was filed by defendants; see Kraiem against JonesTrading, 492 F.Supp. 3d 184 out of the Southern District of New York, obviously in 2020.

On November 17, 2020, plaintiff filed her second amended complaint at ECF 81. In an order dated December 2, 2020, Judge Carter stated that it was not apparent from the pleading that was filed that his limited permission regarding an amended pleading was complied with and granted plaintiff leave to file a motion to amend in support of making the second amended complaint that was on file operative. I'm referring to Judge Carter's December 2, 2020 order filed at ECF 83.

On December 31, 2020, plaintiff filed her motion to amend at ECF 87. In an opinion and order dated May 26, 2021, Judge Carter granted in part and denied in part plaintiff's motion. That's *Kraiem*, 2021 Westlaw 2134818 decided, again, May 26, 2021.

On August 5, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion to supplement her pleading. Judge Carter thereafter referred that motion to me. In an opinion and order dated November 12, 2021, I denied plaintiff's motion to supplement. That's 571 F. Supp 3d, page 53.

After some further litigation regarding plaintiff's pleading, plaintiff filed on January 24, 2022, a document she entitled as her Second Amended Complaint at ECF 146. That's the operative pleading at the moment.

The Court notes that during the period May 2019 to January 2022, the ECF docket reflects that no stay of discovery had been issued by the Court. The ECF docket then reflects no activity between March of 2022, when defendants filed their answer until February of 2023, when the Court directed that a status report be filed. During this entire period, plaintiff could have and should have been conducting discovery.

On February 10, 2023, the Court entered an order setting the fact-discovery deadline as June 30, 2023 and the expert discovery deadline as July 31, 2023. That's ECF 153. The Court's order stated, I'm quoting, "The foregoing deadlines may be extended only for good cause shown, and then any

extensions will be granted only for a limited purpose."

On March 31, 2023, the parties filed a joint letter as required, stating that discovery was ongoing. That's ECF 155. On May 2, 2023, the parties requested, and on May 3, the Court granted an extension of the fact-discovery deadline until August 29, 2023, and an extension of the expert discovery deadline until September 29, 2023. That's ECF 158.

The letter seeking the extension mentioned the various unfortunate family emergencies that Attorney Stulberg was encountering at that time.

On May 19, 2023, the next joint discovery status letter was filed, which the Court endorsed on May 22. The Court's endorsement stated in relevant part, and I'm quoting, "The Court expects the parties to work diligently to meet discovery deadlines." That's ECF 161.

On July 29, 2023, the Court granted the latest discovery extension, stating, "Fact discovery shall be completed by 10-31-2023, and expert discovery shall be completed by 12-1-2023." And the order continues, "No further extensions shall be granted absent exigent circumstances. And if any

further extensions are granted, they shall be for limited specific purposes." That's ECF 168.

On September 28, 2023, more than one month prior to the expiration of the fact-discovery deadline, plaintiff filed another letter seeking a discovery extension, which the Court denied without prejudice, while noting the fact discovery did not close until October 31, 2023. That's ECF 170.

On October 23, 2023, eight days before the current fact-discovery deadline, plaintiff filed a letter motion that is now before the Court seeking to compel production of documents. That's ECF 171.

Together with exhibits, plaintiff's letter motion consists of 175 pages. Defendants filed a letter in response on October 25. That's ECF 173, and plaintiff filed a reply very early this morning at ECF 176.

In addition, yesterday evening the parties filed yet another letter seeking -- letter motion seeking the extension of discovery deadlines. ECF 175. That brings us up to date and informs the Court on its decision on the plaintiff's motion to compel.

Under Rule 26(b)(1), parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that

is relevant to any party's claim or defense, and proportional to the needs of the case. Considering the importance of the issues at stake in this action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

The Court is vested with discretion in determining what is proportional to the needs of the case. At this late stage of the discovery process, in a four-year old case, the Court only shall order production of documents it finds important the limited issues at stake in this case.

The Court thus rules in its discretion as follows:

One -- and I'll be issuing a written order setting forth the operative portions of what I'm about to say so that it'll be crystal clear.

Anybody obviously can order this entire transcript, should they choose to do so.

The Court is ordering as follows:

One, within 14 days, to the extent not already produced, defendant shall produce responsive

documents for the time period May 25, 2016 through January 15, 2018, using the search terms that are set forth in pages two and three of plaintiff's reply filed at ECF, Number 176 (is narrowed by)

"AND" in block caps (Kraiem) or (Nef) or (Nefissa) or (Nefissa SK) or (Nefissa SK\*) or (Nefissa-SK\*) or "Nefissa Soraya Kraiem" or "NK," but excluding the terms, "beauty" and "girl". The hit counts I found to be too high on those. And since I'm making them go back earlier in time, I don't find it proportional to the needs of the case to include the terms, "beauty" and "girl".

The purpose of the Court's ruling here is to capture documents that related to this plaintiff that were prior to the date that she came to the United States to give the context. However, the Court finds it is not appropriate to just search for terms like B-I-T-C-H throughout the entire organization for the period prior to that time.

The documents in the Court's discretion -the important documents are the ones that make
reference to the plaintiff.

Second, with respect to the so-called joint employer status of JTIS and JTIL, the Court finds that the documents sought by plaintiff are not

proportional to the needs of the case.

However, plaintiff may ask questions to the defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) designee, regarding the joint employer issue.

Third, in all other respects, plaintiff's motion to compel is denied, and the parties are directed to proceed with the depositions referred to in ECF Number 175.

Now, look, the Court empathizes with Attorney Stulberg's family and personal medical situation, and my heart goes out to you; however, your law firm website lists five other attorneys in your firm in addition to Attorney deBoer, who is on this call and who is also counsel of record in this case. And I am to bring discovery to a close, and that's what I intend to do.

Thus, the Court will extend discovery deadlines one last time, but not as long as been requested in the letter filed yesterday evening. At the end of September, plaintiff requested a 60-day extension of discovery deadlines, that is, until December 31. Now plaintiff is asking for an extension until January 15, 2024.

The Court would have expected the plaintiff to request a shorter, not a longer discovery

extension after an additional month had gone by.

The Court -- and I might add reluctantly, extends fact discovery to January 3, 2024 and the deadline for expert discovery until February 5, 2024. Those are the dates when all court-sanctioned discovery shall be completed.

You folks want to conduct additional discovery between yourselves, have at it. But any discovery that's going to be authorized by the Court and under the Court's supervision is going to be done by these dates.

The Court will be entering an order following the conference, granting a part and denying a part the letter motions filed at ECF 171 and 175, as previously stated during this conference.

Anything else from either side?

MR. STULBERG: Your Honor, Robert Stulberg.

I just wish to thank the Court for its ongoing

expressions of understanding of my family situation.

And we very much appreciate the courtesies that have been extended by the Court over the course of this last year.

THE COURT: All right. Noted.

Anything from the defense side?

## MR. LEWKOWICZ: No. MR. deBOER: That is all. MR. LEWKOWICZ: Thank you so much, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. This matters is adjourned. Thank you.

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## CERTIFICATE I, Adrienne M. Mignano, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the case of Kraiem v. JonesTrading Institutional Services; Docket #19CV5160 was prepared using digital transcription software and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature <u>Adrienne M. Mignano</u> ADRIENNE M. MIGNANO, RPR Date: November 7, 2023